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INTRODUCTION
In the fiscal year 2017, the DOJ of Justice (“DOJ”) recovered $3.7 billion in settlements and
judgments from civil cases involving fraud under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).1 Of the $3.7
billion obtained, $3.4 billion was recovered in claims filed under the qui tam provision of the Act.2
The qui tam provision authorizes private individuals (“relators”) to bring claims of fraud on behalf
of the United States. In the fiscal year 2017, the United States paid out $392 million to relators.3
While the qui tam mechanism provides an effective method for combatting corporate fraud on
the government, it inevitably inundates the DOJ with meritless claims arising from opportunistic,
disgruntled employees.4 The public benefit of having a relator bring a claim against a corporation
is undeniable: a private party with access to corporate records and executives can gather evidence
within the corporation virtually undetected, providing the United States with a roadmap to make
the case.5 However, the increasingly large sums at stake coupled with the inherent conflict of
interest has given rise to a growing qui tam plaintiffs’ bar.6 The implications of an industrialized

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False
Claims Acts Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-actcases-fiscal-year-2017.
2
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Acts
Cases in Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 1.
3
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Acts
Cases in Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 1.
4
David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement Pathways: Lessons From Qui Tam Litigation,
114 Colum. L. Rev. 1913, 1916-1917 (2014).
5
John Ashcroft et al., Whistleblowers Cash In, Unwary Corporations Pay, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 367,
370 (2011).
6
Ashcroft et al., supra note 5, at 371-372.
1
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motivation for bringing qui tam claims may undermine the goals of relator litigation. While
valuable, relator litigation seems to systematically contradict the FCA’s objective of protecting the
public fisc. Given the scope of the statute, the discretionary considerations required to intervene
in a case, and the incentivizes involved in the very nature of qui tam claims, the United States
should have an absolute right to veto proposed FCA settlements attendant by dismissal between a
relator and a private party because: (1) Under §3730(b)(1), the Attorney General must consent to
the dismissal of all qui tam actions; (2) the relator’s right to conduct the action includes the right
to negotiate a settlement, but it does not exclude the government’s right to unilaterally oppose that
settlement; and (3) the FCA is intended to recoup and return government money fraudulently taken
by private parties, therefore the United States is the party suffering injury and should have control
over the litigation.
This article addresses the seemingly broad right granted to relators through the FCA and the
government’s power to unilaterally supersede that right. §3730(b)(4)(B) states that when the
United States notifies the court that it will not proceed with the action, “the person bringing the
action shall have the right to conduct the action.” It should be noted that §3730(b)(4)(A) states that
when the United States elects to proceed with the action “the action shall be conducted by the
Government”.
The scope of a conducted action is unclear. Under §3730(b)(4)(A), actions conducted by the
United States seem to grant a unilateral and unfettered ability to control every aspect of litigation,
including settlement and subsequent dismissal through the court. However, the relatively limited
scope of a relator’s conduct may indicate that the “right to conduct the action” for a relator is more
narrow than it is for the United States. Does a relator have the right to negotiate and execute a
settlement agreement without government input? Does the right to conduct an action explicitly

3

Callahan Spring AWR
require the ability to negotiate and carry out a settlement in court? Or does the provision in
§3730(b)(1) requiring the Attorney General’s written consent to dismiss an action limit the relator
to negotiating a settlement pursuant to the Attorney General’s consent?
This article narrows the scope of relator action as permitted by the statute. Part I defines the
FCA by examining its original text and subsequent amendments intended to both widen and limit
the scope of relator conduct. It explores the government’s potential course of action when faced
with a relator claim filed under seal and what limitations the United States encounters when
engaging in specific actions. Part II outlines the plain and unambiguous language of the Act,
specifically addressing the §3730(b)(1) “consent-for-dismissal” provision. Part III evaluates the
significance of legislative intent and the role Congress envisioned for both relators and the United
States in qui tam litigation. Part IV addresses the policies implicated in relator actions, including
the benefits of allowing motivated relators to bring FCA suits and how these benefits weigh against
the public interest at stake in qui tam litigation.
I. DEFINING 31 USCS § 3730
31 USCS § 3730, known as the False Claims Act, holds liable any person who “knowingly
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim” for payment from the government.7 The FCA was originally enacted in 1863 to
protect the United States against frauds committed by private contractors.8 Specifically, it was
intended to protect government funds and property from fraudulent claims and bills for shoddy
goods and services provided during the war effort. 9

7

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B).
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547 (1943).
9
United States v. Silver, 384 F. Supp. 617, 619-620 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
8
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The FCA grants a relator the right to bring a civil action, called a qui tam action, 10 on behalf
of the United States for a violation of the FCA. The loss is experienced by the United States, and
the relator acts as a private attorney general to adjudicate the action on the government’s behalf.11
Whatever the relator and her attorney recovers is analogous to an attorney’s contingency fee, while
the rest of the damages are returned to the government to compensate for the injustice.12 The
United States, not the relator, is the party in interest suffering the requisite “injury in fact” to satisfy
Article III standing.13
When the United States elects to intervene, the FCA’s qui tam mechanism entitles relators to
damages of fifteen to twenty five percent of any recovery. 14 When the relator conducts the action
independently, she can recover up to thirty percent of any recovery.15 Upon successful prosecution,
the relator can also recover attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in addition to the sum recovered
from defendants.16 When a relator is involved, the maximum recovery for the public fisc is only
85% of the sum recovered from defendants.
The FCA provides the United States with the discretion to proceed with claims of fraud brought
by relators. The statute states that the private person must serve the United States a copy of the
complaint disclosing substantially all material evidence the person possesses, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(4).17 As originally enacted, the United States had no right to take over an action.18 All

10

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 961 F.2d 46,
49 (4th Cir. 1992).
12
United States ex rel. Milam, 961 F.2d at 49.
13
ex rel. Milam, 961 F.2d at 49.
14
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
15
Id. at § 3730(d)(2).
16
John Ashcroft et al., supra note 5, at 370.
17
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
18
United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1994).
11
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actions were brought by a relator.19 In 1943, the FCA was amended to accommodate for a 60-day
period during which the United States could decide whether it wants to pursue the claim.20 In 1986,
the FCA was amended once again to allow the United States to extend the 60-day period upon a
showing of good cause, pursuant to an in camera review by the court. 21 The complaint is filed
under seal for a 60-day period, during which the United States may determine how to proceed with
the action.22 The government may elect to extend the 60-day period upon a showing of good
cause.23
Once the United States is served with a relator claim filed under seal, it can proceed in three
ways: (1) the government may dismiss the claim provided the relator is given the opportunity for
a hearing on the motion;24 (2) the government may intervene with the action and continue with the
litigation independently;25 or (3) the government may notify the court that it does not wish to
proceed with the action and the relator has the “right to conduct the action”.26
While the United States may seek dismissal of relators’ claims under §3730(c)(2)(A), the FCA
does not provide a standard to determine whether to request a dismissal.27 The DOJ released a
memorandum in January 2018 addressing discretionary dismissals of meritless qui tam claims.28
The Granston Memo acknowledges that there has been a dramatic increase in meritless claims

19

Id.
Id.
21
31 USCS § 3730(b)(3).
22
Id. at § 3730(b)(2).
23
Id. at § 3730(b)(3).
24
Id. at § 3730(c)(2)(A).
25
Id. at § 3730(b)(4)(A).
26
Id. at § 3730(b)(4)(B).
27
DOJ Memorandum, Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), at
3, available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4358602/Memo-for-EvaluatingDismissal-Pursuant-to-31-U-S.pdf.
28
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 1.
20
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filed under the FCA. The Memo establishes a “general framework for evaluating when to seek
dismissal”,29 outlining factors for the United States to consider when determining whether to seek
dismissal of a qui tam claim.
The first factor aims to “curb meritless claims” by dismissing claims relying on defective legal
theories or where relator’s factual allegations are frivolous.30 Second, the DOJ intends to prevent
“parasitic or opportunistic qui tam claims” by identifying claims brought by relators seeking an
“unwarranted windfall” from the action.31 Third, the DOJ seeks to dismiss claims in an effort to
prevent “interference with agency policies and programs”, where a qui tam action contradicts an
agencies policies.32 Fourth, to protect the government’s gatekeeping role to litigation brought on
its behalf, the DOJ asserts that it should seek dismissal when necessary to control litigation on
behalf of the United States.33 Fifth, in cases involving intelligence agencies or military contracts,
the DOJ may dismiss a claim to “safeguard classified information and national security
interests”.34 Sixth, the DOJ recommends seeking dismissal when “the government’s expected costs
are likely to exceed any expected gain.”35 Finally, the DOJ seeks to dismiss a claim when the
relator committed “egregious procedural errors” prior to serving the United States with the
complaint.36
The United States, which includes the DOJ, the U.S. Attorneys Office, and any agencies
responsible for reimbursing claims from the public fisc, such as the DOJ of Health and Human

29

Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 1.
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 3.
31
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 4.
32
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 4-5.
33
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 5.
34
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 6.
35
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 6.
36
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 7.
30
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Services, the DOJ of Defense, and the Veterans Administration consult to determine whether to
intervene in the qui tam action.37 The United States conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine whether intervention is necessary.38 The United States typically intervenes “in cases
that are high-profile, in cases that are novel, and in cases that involve the prospect of significant
recovery”.39 Data collected by Professor David Freeman Engstrom indicates that the United States
is more likely to intervene in cases brought by relators represented by “more sophisticated, repeat
plaintiffs’ counsel”.40
After its investigation, the United States, represented by the Attorney General, may decide to
intervene in actions brought by relators. The scope of this intervention right is defined in
§3730(b)(2), which states “the Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action
within 60 days after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence and information.”
Once the United States intervenes, no party other than the government has the right to intervene
or bring a related action.41 The government’s intervention before the conclusion of the 60-day
period or any extensions allows it to proceed with the action.42 The limits on the intervention clause
are unclear because the United States can request extensions on the 60-day timeline for good
cause.43

37

Kathleen M. Boozang et al., The Ctr. For Health & Pharm. Law & Policy, Seton Hall Law, The
False Claims Act and the Policing of Promotional Claims About Drugs: A Call for Increased
Transparency 3 (2015).
38
Boozang et al., supra note 37, at 3.
39
Boozang et al., supra note 37, at 46.
40
David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of
DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1689, 1696
(2013).
41
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5).
42
Id. at § 3730(b)(4)(A).
43
Id. at § 3730(b)(3).
8
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The United States has often been unwilling to intervene in qui tam claims.44 As noted by the
DOJ in the Granston Memo, while many qui tam claims reveal significant frauds against the
government, a great volume of relator claims do not warrant the resources required to adequately
investigate.45 Because a relator’s financial incentive is considerable, many claims brought by
relators result in fruitless investigation and are decidedly meritless.46 The United States will often
decline to intervene in a case because the evidence provided by a relator is not substantive enough
to warrant intervention until the government has the opportunity to see how the claim fares in
court.47 Thus, the United States retains the right to intervene at later date, upon a showing of good
cause.48
In the Granston Memo, the DOJ asserts that it has an “unfettered discretion” to dismiss
claims.49 This “unfettered discretion” is derived from §3730(b)(1), which provides a further
obstacle to settling a case on the relator’s terms: “The action may be dismissed only if the court
and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”
This unfettered discretion becomes critically important at later stages in litigation. The question
remains whether the Attorney General can force the relator and defendant to continue litigating by
withholding consent for dismissal when the proposed settlement is deemed unsatisfactory by the
United States.

44

Peter Leininger, A New Weapon To Help FDA Control Enforcement Priorities, February 21,
2018,
available
at
https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/005/669/original/2-2118_Law360.pdf?1519248226.
45
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 3.
46
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 3.
47
Boozang et al., supra note 37, at 49.
48
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
49
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), supra note 27, at 7.
9
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II. THE CONSENT-FOR-DISMISSAL PROVISION
Under §3730(b)(1) of the FCA, qui tam actions “may be dismissed only if the court and the
Attorney General give written consent for the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.” Some
circuits suggest that the language of §3730(b)(1) is narrowed by its context; other provisions under
the statute indicate limitations on the Attorney General’s control. When reading the §3730(b)(1)
consent-for-dismissal provision, the 9th Circuit decided that the Attorney General’s consent is
limited to dismissals made within the 60-day period for intervention.50 During the 60-day (or
extended) period, the government retains the absolute right to bar a dismissal. 51 The 9th Circuit
said this absolute right to bar a dismissal does not extend past the 60-day period because, when
read in conjunction with §3730(b)(2), the United States has the right to either “intervene” or
“proceed with the action”.52 When the United States chooses not to intervene, it waives its right to
proceed with the action.53
In United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., the 9th Circuit held that the United
States retains the right to object to a proposed settlement upon a showing of good cause, without
having intervened earlier in the litigation, but it cannot block the settlement by withholding consent
for dismissal. The case involved Killingsworth, a former employee of Northrop, who alleged as a
relator that Northrop improperly inflated cost estimates supporting missile contract proposals,
thereby violating the FCA.54 After investigating the claim for more than 18 months, pursuant to
the requisite extension, the United States chose to not intervene.55 Killingsworth and Northrop

50

United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1994).
United States ex rel. Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 722.
52
ex rel. Killingsworth, 25 F.3d at 722.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 718.
51
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unsuccessfully attempted to settle multiple times due to government objections.56 Although the
United States never intervened, it objected to the proposed settlement which it contended was
structured to ensure that the majority of the money was allocated to the relator under his wrongful
termination claim and attendant attorneys’ fees, rather than recovery to the government pursuant
to the FCA claim.57 Killingsworth and Northrop eventually reached an agreement without the
United States and moved to dismiss the claim, however the United States objected to the
settlement, and despite having declined to exercise its right to intervene for good cause, elected to
intervene for purposes of appeal.58 The lower court decided that the Attorney General’s consent to
dismiss was not required and dismissed the claim.59
In Part III of its decision, the 9th Circuit held that the §3730(b)(1) “consent-for-dismissal”
provision must be read in conjunction with §3730(b)(2), which enumerates the temporal aspect of
the government’s intervention rights.60 Therefore, consent by the Attorney General is only required
to dismiss a claim during the 60-day period or when the United States has elected to intervene in
the action.61 Thus, under the 9th Circuit’s interpretation, the consent-for-dismissal provision is
temporally limited to the period during which the United States can elect to intervene.
Many courts have challenged the 9th Circuit’s reading of the §3730(b)(1).62 The 4th, 5th, and
6th Circuits have subsequently held that the consent-for-dismissal provision is not temporally

56

Id. at 719.
Id. at 718.
58
Id.
59
United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 699 (9th Cir. Cal.,
Jan. 19, 1994).
60
25 F.3d at 720-721.
61
Id.
62
See United States ex rel. Schweizer v. Oce N.V., 677 F.3d 1228, 1233-34 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (rejecting argument that DOJ dismissal or settlement authority is conditional on prior
intervention); Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 931 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Even where
57
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qualified or explicitly limited in any other manner. The 5th Circuit explicitly rejected the 9th
Circuit’s reading of the statute. The 5th Circuit held that the statutory language was unambiguous
and that there is nothing in the FCA that negates or contradicts the plain meaning of the consentfor-dismissal provision.63 In Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., Bortner, a division manager at
Philips, alleged that Philips illegally concealed its decision to withdraw from the US market from
the US government.64 The US government continued to buy and lease equipment from Philips
without knowledge that Philips no longer operated in the US.65 The government objected without
intervening.66 The lower court overruled the objection, executed the settlement, and dismissed the
case, from which the United States appealed.67
The 5th Circuit held that courts may not grant a voluntary dismissal in a FCA suit unless the
U.S. Attorney General consents to the dismissal.68 Under the statutory construction, relators sue
on behalf of both themselves and the government.69 The United States is the real party in interest
even when it does not control the FCA claim.70 The Court rejected the legislative history argument
from Killingsworth and found that in both of the amendments made to the FCA, Congress had
expanded the government’s ability to take control of the litigation.71

the Government has declined to intervene, relators are required to obtain government approval
prior to entering a settlement or voluntarily dismissing the action.")
63
Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 159 (5th Cir. 1997).
64
Searcy, 117 F.3d at 155.
65
117 F.3d at 155.
66
Id. at 158.
67
Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 1:95-CV-363 (E. D. Tex. 1997), appeal docketed,
No. 96-40515 (5th Cir. June 30, 1997).
68
117 F.3d at 155.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 156.
71
Id. at 159-60.
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The Court held that the language of §3730(b)(1) is unambiguous. 72 Despite each of the
amendments to the FCA, Congress never changed the last sentence of §3730(b)(1) requiring the
Attorney General’s consent to the dismissal of a qui tam action.73 Because Congress did not
include language limiting the requisite consent, reading the statute plainly is sufficient to determine
its intent.74
The 6th Circuit similarly, and perhaps, more harshly, rejected the 9th Circuits interpretation of
the consent-for-dismissal provision. In United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., the Doyles’,
as relators, alleged that Health Possibilities illegally sought reimbursement for physician assistant
services that were not “incident to” physician services as required for reimbursement by
Medicare.75 Their complaint was later amended to include allegations that Health Possibilities had
submitted false Medicare claims to the DOJ of Health and Human Services by fraudulently
inflating their Medicare bills by using billing codes that signified services that were more
expensive than the services actually provided, in violation of the FCA.76
At the same time, an employee at Health Possibilities accused Dr. Doyle of sexual
misconduct.77 Dr. Doyle subsequently sued Health Possibilities for defamation.78 The United
States declined to intervene in the FCA action.79 The Doyles’ and Health Possibilities entered a
settlement agreement without the United States, consolidating the FCA claim and the defamation
suit.80 Under the proposed agreement, the United States did not receive any damages because the

72

Id. at 159.
Id.
74
Id. at 159.
75
United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 337 (6th Cir. 2000).
76
Health Possibilities, 207 F.3d at 337.
77
207 F.3d at 337.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
73
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FCA suit was to be settled for attorneys’ fees and injunctive relief.81 The United States objected to
the settlement on the grounds that the relator “essentially channeled damages payments to the
defamation action” to avoid sharing the FCA settlement with the United States.82 The District
Court held that §3730(b)(1) consent-for-dismissal was only required to dismiss claims prior to
government's original intervention decision and that when the government affirmatively chooses
not to intervene, the Relator can settle notwithstanding the government's opposition.83 The District
Court further held that, by waiving its intervention right, the United States constructively consents
to subsequent dismissal without its input.84
The 6th Circuit held that the relator cannot seek a voluntary dismissal of a complaint without
the Attorney General’s consent.85 The Court found that the plain language of 3730(b)(1) did not
temporally limit the consent-for-dismissal provision to the 60-day intervention period.86 The Court
unblinkingly rejected the 9th Circuit’s reading of the statute and found that “If Congress wanted
to limit the consent requirement to the period before the United States makes its initial intervention
decision, we presume that it knew the words to do so.”87 The original version of the FCA did not
have a mechanism for government intervention, however it did contain the consent-for-dismissal
provision.88 This suggests that the consent-for-dismissal provision was never intended to be limited
by the intervention period.

81

Id. at 338.
Id.
83
United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., No. 96-00485 (E. D. Ky. 2000) appeal docketed,
No. 99-5259 (6th Cir. 2000).
84
Id.
85
United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 2000).
86
207 F.3d at 339.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 340.
82
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Most recently, the 4th Circuit used the 9th Circuit’s legislative context justification to prove
the contrary: other provisions of the FCA use temporally-limiting language, but §3730(b)(1) does
not.89 In United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., several former Agape
employees alleged that Agape fraudulently billed Medicare and other federal health care programs
for services to thousands of patients that were not actually provided or were provided to ineligible
patients.90 The government declined to intervene but explicitly request that the relators and Agape
solicit the Attorney General’s written consent before asking the court to rule on a proposed
settlement, pursuant to §3730(b)(1).91 Because there were so many patients and claims involved
in the case, the parties were relying upon statistical sampling of the claims to estimate damages;
however, the United States and the parties disagreed over the methodology for such sampling,
causing them, respectively, to arrive at significantly disparate estimates of the amount owed to the
government.92 Interestingly, the District Court rejected statistical sampling at all.93 The relators,
the United States, and Agape attempted to mediate but were ultimately unsuccessful.94 The relators
eventually came to a settlement agreement with Agape.95 The United States objected to the
proposed settlement because it had done its own statistical sampling during the course of its
investigation and found that the damages would be at least $25 million, however the proposed
settlement was appreciably less than such amount.96 Agape filed a motion to enforce the settlement

89

United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 848 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017).
ex rel. Michaels, 848 F.3d at 333.
91
848 F.3d at 334.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 335.
96
Id.
90
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without the Attorney General’s consent, but the District Court ruled that the United States
possessed absolute veto authority over FCA settlements.97
The 4th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the government possesses an
unreviewable veto authority over the attempted dismissal of FCA claims. 98 The Court found that
§3730(b)(1) means exactly what it plainly says: The Attorney General’s written consent is required
to dismiss an FCA claim.99 The consent-for-dismissal provision is not temporally qualified or
limited in any way. The Court found that other provisions of the statute require the United States
to satisfy a standard of reasonableness which served to limit the provision by requiring the court
to review the government’s action.100 The court pointed to the language in §3730(c)(2)(B) that
says when the government settles an action over a relator’s objection, the court must determine
that “the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances” subject
to a hearing.101 Because this language was readily available to Congress as a mechanism for
limiting the Attorney General’s authority subject to judicial review and Congress chose not to use
it in the consent-for-dismissal context, the 4th Circuit found that Congress did not intend to limit
the Attorney General’s power of dismissal.102
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND STATUTORY CONTEXT DEFINING THE SCOPE OF
RELATOR CONDUCT
The purpose of the FCA is to protect the public from institutions that bring false claims and to
protect government money. When the FCA was first enacted, Congress was responding to reports

97

United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty. Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82379 D.S.C.,
June 25, 2015).
98
848 F.3d at 330.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 339.
101
Id. at 340.
102
Id.
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that the United States was being billed for what the government believed to be valid contracts on
wartime necessities, but was actually nonexistent goods and services.103 In response to this
egregious fraud on the United States, Congress imposed both civil and criminal liability for such
fraud.104 Since then, Congress has trebled the damages provision so that liability is “essentially
punitive in nature.”105 This change indicates that Congress is primarily concerned with preventing
fraud on the United States and is less concerned with compensating private parties affected by the
fraud.
The 9th Circuit has held that Congress intended to place full responsibility for FCA litigation
on private parties.106 The Court came to this conclusion by attempting to discern Congress’ intent
in the context of the legislation’s enactment and subsequent amendments. The Court held that the
government's role in FCA actions pursued by relators has evolved since the legislation was enacted
in 1863.107 Under the original statute the United States did not have the right to take over an action
initiated by a relator. The government’s right to intervene was granted in 1943, when the Act was
amended to give the United States the option to take over a relator’s claim during a 60-day period
of contemplation.108 In 1986, the Act was further amended to give the government the option to
extend the 60-day period upon a showing of good cause. The 9th Circuit examined the Senate
Report accompanying the 1986 amendment to conclude that Congress intended to expand relators’
control over the litigation.109 The Senate Report stated that Congress’ intent was to “encourage
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more private enforcement” by increasing incentives for relators bringing FCA claims.110 The Court
also noted that, according to the Senate Report, the government’s ability to extend the 60-day
intervention period was intended to provide the government with the opportunity to intervene in
“situations where new and significant evidence is found”.111 The Court held that the Senate Report
indicated that, absent early intervention by the United States, Congress intended to place full
responsibility for FCA litigation in private parties.112 It concluded that this intent would be
fundamentally challenged by an absolute veto power.113
The 5th Circuit, too, looked at the legislative history of the FCA and came to a significantly
different conclusion. In its decision in Searcy, the Court acknowledged that when the FCA was
originally enacted in 1863, the United States had no right to intervene in a false claims action.114
However, since the legislation’s inception, Congress has both created the government’s power to
intervene in a relator action, and has subsequently expanded this power to assume control of the
litigation.115 While a number of changes have been made to the language and application of the
Act, essentially resulting in an overhaul of its execution, Congress never eliminated the consentfor-dismissal provision.116 The 5th Circuit did not credit the Senate Report to the extent that the
Court did in Killingsworth, as the Senate Report, while persuasive, is not the law.
The 9th Circuit stands alone in its interpretation of the legislative intent of the FCA. The 6th
Circuit perhaps said it best in its decision in Health Possibilities: “the FCA is not designed to serve
the parochial interests of relators, but to vindicate civic interests in avoiding fraud against public
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monies.”117 The Court found that the qui tam mechanism is not intended to compensate relators.
Instead, it is a mechanism to promote accountability among the public to ensure deterrence of
frauds on the government.118 The qui tam mechanism is an efficient and cost-effective way to make
companies beholden to the system, as relators are individuals who have been wronged by a private
actor and are incentivized to achieve justice.119 This broad principle is entirely consistent with
securing the government’s ability to protect the public interest at stake. This suggests that Congress
intended to grant the United States authority over privately negotiated settlements even when it
does not intervene.120
The “right to conduct an action” under § 3730(b)(4)(B) includes the right to negotiate a
settlement, but it does not preclude the United States from objecting to that settlement. While
determining the plain meaning of a statute requires a determination of legislative intent to some
extent, courts ultimately rely on statutory context to determine where the right to conduct an action
begins and ends. The relator’s right to conduct an action is derived from § 3730(b)(4)(B), which
states that “[b]efore the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions obtained under paragraph
(3), the Government shall … notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case
the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action”, and § 3730(c)(3), which
states that “[i]f the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the person who initiated the
action shall have the right to conduct the action.” One thing is clear: the legislation is intended to
protect the public from institutions that bring false claims and to protect the public fisc. More
generally, however, while some courts say that Congress intended to place full responsibility for
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FCA litigation on the relators,121 others have found that the United States has control over the
litigation. Because the legislation is intended to avoid fraud on the government and the United
States is the real party in interest, the United States should retain control over claims brought under
the FCA.
The 9th Circuit held that the government does not have the right to block the settlement because
the relator has the right to conduct the action on its own after the United States fails to intervene
while the case is under seal.122 The Court decided that the amendments to the FCA indicated that
Congress intended to place full responsibility for FCA litigation on private parties when the United
States declines to intervene.123 According to the 9th Circuit, allowing the United States to have an
“absolute” right to block a settlement contravenes this intent.124
The 9th Circuit further held that § 3730(b)(4)(B) grants relators the right to conduct the action
when the United States has elected not to intervene and that the right to conduct the action
necessarily includes the right to negotiate a settlement.125 The Court held that the right to conduct
an action obviously includes the right to negotiate a settlement according to § 3730(d)(2) because
the person “bringing the action” or “settling the claim” must be the same person.126 Under this
assumption, the relator is both the person “bringing the action” and the person “settling the claim”,
and as that person satisfying those roles, the relator has conducted the action.
In part IV of its decision, however, the Court held in the United States’ favor by finding that
the government retains the right to object to a proposed settlement upon a showing of good cause,
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without having intervened earlier in the litigation.127 In the Court’s interpretation of 31 U.S.C. §
3730(c)(2)(B), it found that the United States cannot force a relator to continue litigation, but it
can question a settlement upon a showing of good cause.128 The Court noted that 31 U.S.C. §
3730(c)(3) grants the United States the right to intervene at a later date.129 It distinguished this
intervention upon a showing of “good cause” from the government’s attempt to block the
settlement as a limited intervention and determined that 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) did not apply.130
However, the Court found that the same principal applies: upon a showing of good cause, the
United States can object to the proposed settlement based on concerns fairness, adequacy, and
reasonableness.131 In the same way that a relator can question a settlement requiring a review by
the court, the 9th Circuit extended this interpretation of the “good cause” requirement to the
government when objecting to a relator settlement.132 The case was remanded to the lower court
for a determination of good cause.133 Interestingly, the District Court subsequently affirmed the
settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice.134
The 9th Circuit’s analysis of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) fails to account for the requisite consent
from the Attorney General to dismiss the claim. While the relator can, and often does, negotiate
the settlement, the Attorney General must ultimately consent to the dismissal of the claim. The 9th
Circuit wants “settling the claim” to include dismissing the claim, however, claims cannot be
dismissed without the Attorney General’s consent, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
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The 4th and 5th Circuits have come to a similar conclusion. The 5th Circuit held that the
relator’s right to conduct the action under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) does not necessarily include
the right to negotiate a settlement in that action.135 The Court decided that “a relator has
‘conducted’ an action if he devises strategy, executes discovery, and argues the case in court, even
if the government frustrates his settlement efforts”.136 Under this understanding of the “right to
conduct the action” clause, there is no conflict between the government’s right to veto voluntary
settlements and the relator’s right to control the litigation.137
In Agape, the Court held that, contrary to the decision in Killingsworth, 31 U.S.C. §
3730(b)(4)(B) and 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) do not create an unfettered right for the relator to settle
an action.138 The Court relied on the 5th Circuit’s explanation of when an action is “conducted”,
as explained in Searcy. Under this analysis of the statute, the right to conduct the action and the
right to settle the claim are not mutually exclusive.139 In some cases, absent the Attorney General’s
objection, the relator will have control over the settlement.140 However, an action has been
conducted regardless of whether the United States decides to veto the settlement.141
IV. POLICY
The FCA includes a qui tam provision because the scope of fraud on the United States is much
broader than the government’s ability to detect it.142 The qui tam provision allows the United States
to detect fraud that it would not otherwise be able to discern. The system for submitting claims is
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fairly removed from the government’s watchful eye, therefore the United States must rely on
participants holding themselves accountable. Allowing relators to bring a claim on behalf of the
government is the most cost-effective and efficient method to hold perpetrators accountable.143
Relators hold perpetrators liable to private persons who are motivated by “ill will” or “personal
gain”.144 Economic downturn and employee layoffs tend to create a class of relators willing to risk
damaging their relationship with an employer, resulting an increase in qui tam filings. 145 In fact,
there is no requirement that the relator be personally harmed by the defendant’s conduct at all to
gain a percentage of the recovery from a successful suit.146 The United States must retain control
over the litigation because private interest and public good do not necessarily overlap, thus the
government must focus the litigation on pursuing the public good.147
When allowing a relator to bring claim on behalf of the United States, the United States is wary
of relators’ attempting to unjustly enrich themselves, therefore reducing benefits to the public fisc.
Any judgment entered for the relator has a preclusive effect on the United States, as the relator
brings the claim on behalf of the United States.148 This res judicata concern is critical, as settling a
claim with a relator becomes quite valuable for a defendant looking to avoid confrontation with
the United States. This incentivizes the relator to “shift settlement proceeds away from FCA fraud
claims, where a relator receives only a portion of the winnings under the FCA's bounty provisions,
and toward the other claims, where recovery is dollar-for-dollar.”149
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In Searcy, Bortner, had negotiated with Philips without the government’s input. The United
States objected to the settlement on two grounds: (1) the Attorney General’s investigation, the
conclusion of which suggested that the proposed settlement amount was too low; and (2) releasing
the claim would preclude the United States from pursuing future claims arising out of issues that
the United States had not yet had the opportunity to investigate.150 This preclusion would be
valuable to Philips, a value that could potentially be leveraged by Bortner, and may have the result
of increasing the settlement amount. Bortner had essentially boosted the value of the settlement by
“bargaining away” claims on behalf of the United States.151 However, 31 U.S.C. §3730(b)(1)
provides protection against this by allowing the United States to refuse the settlement when it
perceives the relator receiving an unjust enrichment from the agreement.
CONCLUSION
The dangers of allowing a relator to bring an FCA action against a company without input
from the United States are significant. Due to res judicata concerns, the United States must consent
to a dismissal of a proposed settlement attendant to the dismissal of a qui tam claim between a
relator and a defendant, even if the United States does not choose to intervene at an earlier stage
of litigation. The FCA provides such a mechanism under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). It further narrows
the scope of a relator’s conduct under 31 U.S.C. §§§ 3730(b)(4), 3730(c)(3), and 3730(d)(4).
Therefore, the United States reserves an absolute veto power over settlements attendant to
dismissal under the FCA.
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